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ABSTRACT
Better exposing congestion can improve traffic management
in the wide-area, at peering points, among residential broad-
band connections, and in the data center. TCP’s network
utilization and efficiency depends on congestion informa-
tion, while recent research proposes economic and policy
models based on congestion. Such motivations have driven
widespread support of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)
in modern operating systems. We reappraise the Internet’s
ECN readiness, updating and extending previous measure-
ments. Across large and diverse server populations, we find
a three-fold increase in ECN support over prior studies. Us-
ing new methods, we characterize ECN within mobile infras-
tructure and at the client-side, populations previously un-
measured. Via large-scale path measurements, we find the
ECN feedback loop failing in the core of the network 40% of
the time, typically at AS boundaries. Finally, we discover
new examples of infrastructure violating ECN Internet stan-
dards, and discuss remaining impediments to running ECN
while suggesting mechanisms to aid adoption.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer Communication Networks]: Network
Operations—network monitoring ; C.2.1 [Computer Com-




Explicit Congestion Notification, Router-Assisted Conges-
tion Control
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet’s traditional end-to-end approach to conges-
tion control, TCP, attempts to simultaneously optimize ef-
ficiency and fairness between traffic flows[14]. Cooperating
end host TCPs must infer congestion via packet loss. As a
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distributed control problem, on the whole, TCP works re-
markably well and has scaled through orders of magnitude
speed increases. However, a large body of prior work recog-
nizes several shortcomings.
First, the TCP rate equation biases against particular
flows, particularly those that are short-lived or with high de-
lay. Second, given the ubiquity of wireless devices, loss may
be an inappropriate congestion signal. Third, the TCP feed-
back control loop necessarily results in under-utilization and
oscillatory behavior (the TCP “sawtooth”). Finally, large
bandwidth-delay flows are unable to fully utilize available
bandwidth as the bandwidth-probing is conservative [14].
A well-studied approach to congestion is active queue man-
agement. Routers along a path know precisely their buffer
occupancy and may signal an end host to slow its sending
rate in the face of incipient congestion, i.e. without induc-
ing packet loss. Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) is a
standardized TCP addition providing such feedback [24].
The benefits of ECN are only realized when end-hosts
and routers support ECN. Today, equipment vendors largely
support ECN and all major operating systems (Windows,
Linux, OSX) support ECN. After more than a decade, much
of the Internet has the capability to leverage ECN. However,
few networks employ ECN and few devices at the edge ini-
tiate ECN connections.
The adoption of ECN may change given a renewed interest
in managing congestion (e.g. [12]). Recent work illustrates
how ECN may be leveraged to provide new Internet prim-
itives and semantics. In addition to IETF standards lever-
aging ECN [10, 23], the IETF congestion exposure (conex)
group is developing experimental standards that expose the
source and location of congestion along a path potentially
enabling new economic and billing models [7]. Among ser-
vice providers, congestion, rather than traffic volume, is a
potential alternative basis for interconnection and peering
agreements [8]. Similar arguments apply to using induced
congestion to bill and monitor residential broadband con-
nections rather than adopting volume caps [4].
Finally, managing congestion is increasingly important
within data centers and cloud providers. The common prac-
tice of partitioning a problem (e.g. web query) and aggre-
gating the results must be performed within stringent la-
tency requirements. Long-lived heavy bandwidth flows ham-
per this ability by inducing large queues. Recent proposals
based on an analysis of real-world data center traffic rely on
ECN to better handle such workloads [2].
In light of recent system and infrastructure adoption of
ECN and the growing realization that ECN provides poten-
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tial benefits to managing congestion [15], we perform large-
scale measurements to reappraise the Internet’s ability to
properly support ECN. Our primary contributions include:
1. An examination of ECN support among various server
populations, including updated measurements of a pre-
viously surveyed population [17, 22].
2. Analysis of millions of Internet paths to identify where
ECN fails or is mis-marked, and the implications for
congestion safety.
3. Case studies of infrastructure ECN misbehavior; im-
plications on deployment and protocol design.
4. A novel measurement of client-side, e.g. eyeball, ECN
support.
2. BACKGROUND
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [24, 26, 6] defines
an enhancement to TCP/IP that provides router-assisted
congestion control in the Internet. The fundamental idea is
to allow routers along a path, devices with explicit knowl-
edge of their output queue occupancy, to mark packets of
a TCP flow. This mark is echoed back to the source TCP.
The source TCP thus receives notification of incipient con-
gestion, allowing it to reduce congestion before loss occurs.
Mechanically, ECN adds two additional bits in the flags
portion of the TCP header: ECN Echo (ECE) and Con-
gestion Window Reduced (CWR), and changes the original
semantics of the 8-bit type-of-service (ToS) field in the IP
header. Instead of a byte of ToS, six bits are used for the
Differentiated Service Code Point while two remaining bits
encode three possible ECN states: no-ECN ‘00’, ECN Ca-
pable Transport (ECT) ‘10’ or ‘01’, and Congestion Expe-
rienced (CE) ‘11’. As shown in §4, legacy handling of these
bits as the old ToS field is a frequent cause of ECN failure.
ECN capability is negotiated between TCP end-points by
setting the ECE and CWR flags in the SYN and the ECE
flag in the SYN/ACK of TCP’s three-way handshake. If ne-
gotiated, TCP sets ECT in the IP header of data segments.
Routers along the path may, in response to congestion, set
CE on packets marked as ECN capable with ECT. Upon re-
ceiving a segment with CE, a TCP sets ECE on all acknowl-
edgments until the source reduces its congestion window and
sets CWR.
ECN requires both TCPs and routers along an end-to-end
path of a flow to support ECN. There are several points of
potential failure or misbehavior. In this paper, we examine
all of these points. In particular, we ask several questions:
1. What fraction of hosts successfully negotiate ECN?
2. When TCP negotiates ECN, is the connection marked
as ECN capable at the IP layer?
3. Do routers and/or middleboxes erroneously clear or set
congestion marks?
4. If a synthetic IP congestion signal (CE) is introduced,
is a corresponding TCP ECE observed?
5. If a synthetic TCP ECE is sent, is the corresponding
TCP CWR observed?
Previous measurement efforts [17, 22] found little sup-
port for ECN: on the order of 2% of servers or less, and
an even smaller percentage of flows with ECN apparently
enabled [19]. These results were not surprising as ECN was
turned off by default on most operating systems due to an
ECN blackhole problem. Of servers tested [22] in 2008, TCP
SYN packets with ECN set were silently dropped 0.56% of
the time. However, the recent widespread adoption of, and
support for, ECN in operating systems suggests that a reap-
praisal of previous studies is warranted. For instance, server-
mode ECN was introduced into the Linux kernel (2.6.29) in
2009, and enables ECN for incoming TCP connections that
indicate ECN capability. Thus, while ECN is finally part of
all major operating system TCP/IP stacks, it is being de-
ployed conservatively – clients must be explicitly configured
to initiate ECN for outgoing TCP connections, presenting a
challenge we address in §3.3.
Given the potential network impact of these widespread
changes, we reexamine and extend previous studies of ECN.
In addition to enhanced testing of all the ECN messages two
hosts can exchange, we also sought to test other parts of the
network for ECN readiness, not just popular web servers.
These include client-side (e.g. eyeball) networks such as res-
idential broadband networks and tests that provide insight
into the use of ECN by mobile devices. Mobile infrastruc-
ture is of interest not only because of the particular utility
of ECN in wireless environments, but also because operators
often control both the handset and network proxies.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Server Testing
We measure three web server populations: 1) the top one
million web servers [1] as ranked by Alexa; 2) a collection
of approximately 7500 university and college web servers
identified by [11]; and 3) web servers that handle requests
from mobile devices (which we discuss separately below).
For each domain, we retrieve the complete web page (HTML
and all page resources hosted by the same domain) using a
client configured to initiate outgoing ECN connections. We
use the native TCP stack of the measurement host’s Linux
operating system to retrieve the resources. Using Linux’s
iptables firewall connection tracking and mangling rules we
artificially introduce all ECN signals.1 We simulate con-
gestion along the outgoing path by setting CE on all data
packets sent by the measurement host and we simulate con-
gestion along the incoming data path by reporting ECE to
the remote sender. Our implementation guarantees that all
data packets, including retransmissions, sent by our client
have CE set until ECE is heard. Similarly it guarantees ECE
is sent in response to all incoming data packets until CWR
is heard. If a server fails to respond to SYNs with ECN, we
retry the server with a non-ECN enabled SYN to identify
possible ECN blackholes. A benefit of our implementation
is that we can easily test any application or service which
relies upon TCP – a feature we leverage to test additional
populations described below.
We capture all packets that occur during the exchange
and analyze the resulting trace. The analysis of whether or
not ECN is negotiated on a particular connection is straight-
forward – does the response SYN/ACK from the server have
the ECE flag set. Next, we examine whether the ECN ca-
pable transport code point (ECT) is set in the IP header
of data packets for those flows which negotiate ECN. Note,
re-transmitted packets and packets without data do not set
ECT. However, if no data packets are marked with ECT,
1See http://ecn.csail.mit.edu for full details.
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Table 1: Server population results; “-” indicates no data available
Year/Population 2004 2008 Alexa University Mobile
Hosts classified 80,498 (100%) 1,349,711 (100%) 541,885 (100%) 7563 (100%) 3,591 (100%)
ECN-capable 1,765 ( 2.2%) 14,407 ( 1.1%) 93,232 (17.2%) 1061 (14.0%) 559 (15.6%)
Not ECN-capable 78,733 (97.8%) 1,335,304 (98.9%) 448,653 (82.8%) 6,502 (86.0%) 3032 (84.4%)
Possible ECN blackhole 814 (1.0%) 7,627 (0.6%) 3293 (0.6%) 37 ( 0.5%) 5 ( 0.1%)
ECT in non-ECN flow - - 698 (0.15%) 13 ( 0.2%) 9 ( 0.3%)
no ECT in ECN flow 758 ( 42%) - 5,598 ( 6.0%) 302 (28.5%) 63 (11.3%)
no ECE for CE 1,302 ( 1.6%) - 3,995 ( 4.3%) 267 (25.2%) 21 ( 3.8%)
no CWR for ECE - - 55 ( 0.05%) 0 ( 0.0%) 1 ( 0.2%)
we show with our traceroute measurements that something
along the path likely is improperly clearing the ECN bits.
(We discuss some of the causes for this misbehavior in later
sections.) We believe that all major operating systems im-
plement ECN functionality correctly
Since we set CE on the client’s packet that contained the
HTTP request (and all potential retransmissions), we expect
to see a ECE in all traces where the web server responded
with a HTTP status message. The analysis of CWR however
is dependent upon the number of data packets we receive
from the server since some data packets will already be in
flight by the time the server receives the first ECE message
(which we only send in response to data packets from the
server). We attempt to maximize the number of packets a
server sends by setting the TCP’s maximum segment size
option to 300. We also turn off all segmentation and receive
offload features in Linux.
We report on full ECN functionality tests from a single
vantage point at MIT, but have conducted limited testing
from other vantage points, in particular from non-Internet2
connected networks. We describe the ECN tests of paths
that we run from > 125 PlanetLab [25] locations below.
3.2 Mobile Infrastructure
ECN can be particularly beneficial in wireless environ-
ments where loss does not necessarily indicate congestion.
We therefore seek to characterize the ECN capabilities and
behavior of web server side wireless-specific infrastructure by
obtaining a population of servers dedicated to hosting con-
tent for wireless mobile devices, e.g. cellular smartphones.
We note that the content provided from a web server to a
client is often tailored to the properties of the client device,
especially for mobile devices. Additionally, mobile devices
are frequently redirected to a different, dedicated server for
mobile content. We leverage this common practice to obtain
a population of servers dedicated to serving mobile content
for subsequent ECN analysis.
For all domains in the Alexa 1M population, we issue five
different HTTP GET queries, each with a distinct “User-
Agent”HTTP header string. The user agent string mimics a
desktop, and four different mobile phones. If the queried web
server returns an HTTP 3xx redirect to a location different
than the desktop query for any of the phone queries, we
record the location. For example, a query from a desktop
to www.bloomberg.com is not redirected, while a query from
a phone user agent is redirected to mobile.bloomberg.com;
these hostnames correspond to different IP addresses.
Using this technique, we find ∼82,000 sites performing
HTTP redirection on the basis of the user agent. Of those,
7,422 redirect to distinct mobile infrastructure, i.e. redirect
to a URL that resolves to a different IP address. We use the
later population for analysis of mobile web sites.
3.3 Client Testing
Understanding client-side ECN support is important for
several reasons, notably since clients represent “eyeballs” in
the network, i.e. humans sensitive to congestion. However,
while prior work (§2) investigates the prevalence of server-
side ECN, client-side support has received little attention.
Maier et al. observe a negligible number of hosts initiating
ECN capable TCP in a large residential broadband network
[19]. The lack of ECN in Maier’s study is unsurprising as
operating systems that support ECN, with typical default
settings, did not and still do not negotiate ECN for outgoing
connections. Because passive measurements provide only a
limited view into client-side ECN capabilities, we develop a
new hybrid passive/active method.
Our technique measures a large section of two peer-to-
peer (P2P) networks – where nodes act as both clients and
servers – to capture the ECN behavior of a population of
Internet clients. We build BitTorrent and Gnutella crawlers
on an ECN-enabled measurement host under our control.
Our BitTorrent [9] crawler discovers torrents via aggregated
RSS feeds, connects to the torrent’s tracker(s), and obtains
a list of torrent peer IP addresses. The crawler attempts
a BitTorrent handshake with each peer, thereby initiating
ECN and sending data segments without transferring con-
tent. Simultaneously, we capture all packets for analysis.
For Gnutella, we use an existing crawler [27].
Our crawlers negotiate ECN for all connections to remote
nodes in the P2P network, the majority of which reside in
residential networks. By observing the behavior of the nego-
tiation, and subsequent response to synthetic ECN signals
introduced using the aforementioned iptables rules (§3.1),
we gain insight on the prevalence of ECN on an end-to-end
basis in the Internet.
3.4 End-to-End ECN Path Testing
If a router does not have any features turned on that lever-
age the ECN field, it should not modify the ECN field in any
way. From conversations with network operators, none re-
ported turning on ECN markings. However, we leverage
traceroute to identify links where the ECN bits in the IP
header are being modified. ICMP TTL-exceeded messages
include the first 28B of the packet that expired, the so-called
ICMP “quotation.” This quotation provides path-level vis-
ibility into the ECN field. We make use of this feature by
setting the ECT code point in a series of tests from our Plan-
etLab nodes to the web server populations described above.
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While most ICMP quotations are reliable and accurate, like
[20] we find some small evidence of quotation error.
Filtering differences raise the question of which type of
probe (ICMP, UDP, TCP-SYN, TCP-ACK) should test a
path. We did not find any apparent differences in how
routers responded to packets with the ECN field set in a
comparison of probe types to a 10,000 node sample set.
Therefore we used Scamper’s [18] ICMP-paris traceroute
mode [3] (even though ICMP packets would not normally
be ECN marked) since it was likely to discover more hops.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Server results
Table 1 provides our results of ECN testing to the web
server populations in September of 2011. Where applicable,
we include results from previous studies in 2004 [21] and
2008 [17] for comparison purposes. The number of servers
which negotiated ECN rose to between 14% to 17% in all web
server populations. A possible ECN SYN blackhole existed
in less than 0.6% of tests. But we caution that this may
over-estimate the percentage as false positives could occur
both in our methodology and the previous studies if a lossy
link happened to drop the ECN enabled SYN packets but
not the subsequent SYN packets without ECN. Definitively
identifying ECN blackholes would require repeated probing
of the same server with both ECN and non-ECN SYNs.
The rest of the table rows report various ways in which
the ECN congestion feedback loop can be broken. We con-
servatively report on not receiving a CWR in response to
ECE only if we receive more than 10 data packets from the
server i.e. we receive a subsequent flight of packets after the
server must have received ECE notifications. The variation
across different populations is striking – the ECN field in the
IP header on flows to and from university networks is be-
ing cleared 25.2% and 28.5% of the time respectively.2 This
is far higher than the comparable percentages of paths to
Alexa web hosts – 3.8% outbound and 11.3% inbound.
In limited testing from different vantage points, the per-
centages of ECN capable servers across target populations
remained consistent. The results characterizing the bro-
ken ECN feedback loop showed more variation. This is ex-
pected given that these results depend upon the network
path between our measurement vantage points and the tar-
get servers. Our traceroute measurements below shed addi-
tional light on these variations.
4.2 Client-side results
Table 2 shows that fewer clients negotiated ECN on in-
coming connections; 4.2% to less than 0.1% depending on
population. To better understand this discrepancy, we em-
ploy stack fingerprinting to the TCP SYN/ACK packets [5]
to infer the operating system of the client. Table 3 shows a
striking difference between the ECN capable and non-ECN
capable populations: the vast majority of ECN capable hosts
are Linux (88.4%).
4.3 End-to-End ECN Paths
We collected two sets traces to determine where on the
path the ECT codepoint was cleared, and related aspects.
The first trace set includes one randomly-chosen destination
2When there is no ECE for a CE, either the outbound CE
could be being cleared or the inbound ECE.
Table 2: Client Population Data
Population Gnutella BitTorrent
Hosts classified 126,984 (100%) 16,602 (100%)
ECN-capable 106 (0.1%) 701 ( 4.2%)
Not ECN-capable 126,878 (99.9%) 15,901 (95.8%)
ECT in non-ECN flow 2,153 (1.7%) 452 ( 2.8%)
no ECT in ECN flow 44 (42%) 117 ( 17%)
no ECE for CE 10 ( 9%) 167 ( 24%)
no CWR for ECE 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)









Windows 29.9% 0.0% 24.6% 0.0%
Mac/BSD 3.9% 29.5% 8.9% 4.4%
Linux 1.1% 46.6% 7.0% 88.4%
Other 65.1% 23.9% 59.5% 7.14%
from each of the globally routable BGP prefixes ( 367,000)
in order to touch all origin AS’s and be broadly represen-
tative of Internet paths. The second trace set represents
“popular” destinations, and thus used the 542,000 unique
addresses from the Alexa top 1 million [1]. For the prefix-
traces, we used 127 PlanetLab nodes, from 29 countries and
5 continents, to initiate the traces. And for the website-
traces, we were able to use some additional nodes for a total
of 140. Each PlanetLab node executed a trace to each of the
destinations, for a total of 117 million traces collected.
Percent of Traces which passed the ECT codepoint
The location of any devices that modify the ECT codepoint
relative to our tracing vantage points is important. At one
extreme, ECT is cleared on 100% of the traces originating
from particular PlanetLab nodes due to all traces passing
through a misbehaving device at the first or second hop.
Traces from these nodes are not reflective of the whole In-
ternet, but are relevant for the clients at that location.
ICMP filtering behavior impacts our macro analysis as
well. For a few vantage points, the vast majority of their
traces are blocked after a few hops, and for the hops that did
respond, the ECT codepoint remained set; thus these traces
could be grouped with those that preserved the codepoint,
though in reality farther along the path the codepoint might
have been cleared.
Across all traces, the ECT codepoint is unmodified for
83% and 82% of the popular website and prefix traces re-
spectively. Restricting the analysis to those traces where all
hops respond, including the destinations, does not qualita-
tively affect our results, yielding 84% and 80% respectively.
To remove the impact of nodes where the ECT codepoint
is cleared on almost all of the traces, if we omit the 20% of
nodes that had the fewest traces where the ECT remained
set, then for each of remaining nodes, the ECT codepoint
remained set on 94% to 98% of the website-traces and 90%
to 99% of the prefix-traces.
Location on the path where the ECT codepoint is cleared
When the ECT codepoint is modified, we wish to attribute
such misbehavior to an interface hop on the path. However,
there is ambiguity in identifying the responsible device. For
example, while sending probes with ECT set, suppose inter-


















interface hop divided by number of interface hops on path
CDF of interface-hop on path at which ECT code point is cleared
website-traces; last hop ECT is set
website-traces; first hop ECT is cleared
prefix-traces;  last hop ECT is set
prefix-traces;  first hop ECT is cleared
Figure 1: CDF of interface-hop on path at which
ECT codepoint is cleared
that preserve ECT, while the fifth hop’s quotation shows
ECT cleared. The responsible device could be the router at
the fifth hop, the router at the fourth hop, or some middle-
box (e.g. a firewall, switch, or load balancer) between the two
that does not decrement TTL. The case of the prior router
being responsible occurs when routers decrement TTLs and
expire packets before performing other processing on the in-
coming packet. As mentioned in Section 3.4, there is also
the possibility of ICMP misquotations.
To resolve this ambiguity, we collect into a set “A” the in-
terfaces that did not clear ECT, i.e. interfaces where, on any
trace, the response from the next hop preserved ECT. As-
suming that an interface/router is consistent as to whether
it clears or preserves ECT, then for all the traces, the in-
terfaces in “A” should not clear ECT. We find cases where:
(1) the interface first reporting ECT cleared is in “A,” and
(2) the prior interface is in “A.” In our traces, one case does
not dominate the other. More interestingly, we discover a
third case where both interfaces are in “A,” which suggests
the action of middleboxes, and/or casts into doubt the as-
sumption of consistency. In the following we do not assume
which box cleared the codepoint, but report the two bound-
ing possibilities (given that the returned value is accurate).
For traces where all interface hops respond, and where
ECT is cleared, we record the hop number of the last router
interface that preserves ECT, and of the interface that first
reported the cleared codepoint. By normalizing by the num-
ber of interface hops on the path, Figure 1 shows the CDF
of the relative position of ECT misbehavior along probed
paths. Examining at the bottom curve, “prefix-traces; first
hop ECT is cleared,” for 40% of the traces the interface hop
which first reports ECT cleared is at 20% or less along the
path. At the upper end of the CDF, for 20% of the traces,
the hop which first reports ECT cleared is in within the last
20% of the path. Thus 40% of the traces fall in-between.
All four CDF’s show that there is a substantial portion of
the mass in the middle range of the path – suggesting that
there is significant misbehavior within the core of the net-
work. (For both the website and prefix traces, the median
number of interface hops was 16 and only 4% of the paths
had 10 or fewer hops.) Since the last hop where the ECT is
set always comes before the first hop where ECT is cleared,
the CDF of the former lies above that of the latter. Figure
1 shows that, overall, the ECT is cleared earlier on paths to
the popular websites.
AS’s where the ECT codepoint is cleared
Attributing cleared ECT to an AS introduces a well-known
ambiguity: router interfaces between AS’s may be assigned
addresses from either peer AS, or even use outside or private
addresses. We perform a basic disambiguation by scanning
across all traces and looking for instances where the sub-
sequent hop’s interface address is from the address space
originated by the same AS as the address of current hop.
With this requirement, many interface hops are not resolved
to an AS, and are simply labeled as “unknown.” With this
determination, we then scan through the traces a second
time, looking for where the ECT codepoint is cleared. In
the future, we will perform a more thorough procedure to
determine border routers [13].
In analogy to Figure 1, we would like to estimate where
on the AS path the ECT codepoint is first cleared. For
the set of prefix-traces where all hops responded, we revisit
the subset on which the ECT codepoint was cleared, and
the pair of router-interface hops between which this first oc-
curred. Using our restricted inference technique, frequently
one, or both, of these router interfaces can not be associ-
ated with certainty to an AS. This is expected since some
providers still clear the legacy ToS byte at their network
ingress, i.e. between AS’s. We find that 55% these pairs
of router-interface hops have one of the AS’s classified as
“unknown,” and 11% have both so classified, and thus 34%
have both hops associated with an AS. When the two AS’s
are known, for 99% of the traces, the two AS’s are the same;
and for these, 32% are the same as the source AS, 17% are
the same as the destination AS, and the remainder, 51%,
are distinct from the source and destination AS. Thus we do
see cases where the ECT codepoint is cleared interior to an
AS (that is not the source AS).
Of all the AS’s seen on the prefix-traces, only about 1%
were detected to have cleared the ECT codepoint. In par-
ticular, of the over 37,000 AS’s seen on the prefix-traces,
only 177 AS’s were detected to have definitely cleared the
codepoint (the two AS’s that bound the clearing of the code-
point are the same); and only an additional 343 AS’s might
have cleared the codepoint. Though, if the codepoint had
not been cleared at the given interface, it possibly would
have been cleared at a subsequent interface/AS that was
not detected by our experiment.
In order to proceed with the estimation, we assume an
interface whose AS has been classified as “unknown” is actu-
ally in the nearest, previous AS that was known on the path.
Since we know the AS of the source, this assumption allows
us to assign an AS number to every interface on the path.
Note that this assumption biases the location at which the
ECT codepoint is cleared towards earlier on the AS path.
The results are presented in Table 4 (This is analogous to
the plot “prefix-traces; first hop ECT is cleared” in Figure
1.) We restrict the table to AS-paths lengths that accounted
for at least 1% of the traces. For a given AS-path length (a
given row in the table) and for each AS hop on the path, we
report the percent of traces at which the ECT codepoints
is first observed to be cleared. For paths of length 4, the
most popular length, the ECT codepoint was cleared at an
intermediate AS on 30% of the traces, and for paths of length
175








For each AS hop on
path, precent of traces
in which ECT codepoint
is first cleared
2 1 58 42
3 19 60 25 15
4 40 58 11 19 12
5 28 44 16 12 19 9
6 10 37 8 28 11 12 4
7 1 37 4 35 6 11 6 1
5, the percentage is 47%. If the calculation is repeated where
we no longer require that all interfaces on the path respond,
but only that the destination responds, the percents in Table
4 are roughly the same.
Note that since our assumption of assigning “unknown”
AS’s to the previous known AS on the path introduces a
bias towards earlier on the path, the percents in Table 4
underestimate how far along the path the ECT codepoint is
cleared. Also recall that Table 4, and Figure 1, report the
location where the ECT codepoint is first cleared; and thus
if the codepoint had not been cleared at the given interface,
it possibly would have been cleared at a subsequent one.
Thus, the percents in Table 4 should be viewed as approxi-
mations. However, the implication from Table 4, consistent
with Figure 1, is that the ECT codepoint is not only be-
ing cleared in the origin (and destination AS), but also at
intermediate AS’s.
Other notable behaviors
For 99% of the website and prefix traces, the quoted ECN
field from probe responses had either ECT set for all hops or
had ECT cleared at some hop and the field remained cleared.
For the remaining 1% of the traces, we observe a variety of
behaviors. On some traces, the reported ECT codepoint
changes several times between set and cleared; a few traces
had as many as 14 switches in value. We also find instances
where the Congestion Experienced (CE) codepoint is set.
Across the two trace sets, there were 98 unique hop pairs
for which the ECN field switched to CE. For these pairs, the
CE codepoint is often set in conjunction with the diffserv
codepoint having a non-zero value, thus in all likelihood the
network is making use of the legacy ToS field.
5. MITIGATION OPTIONS
While ECN nonce[26] is often seen as a mechanism to
ensure that a receiver correctly reflects the congestion signal
carried in the ECN bits of the IP header, it can also serve
as a mechanism for ensuring correct ECN behavior along a
path (see section in 6.2 [26]). Network devices that mangle
the ECN bits destroy the ability of the receiver to correctly
calculate the ECN nonce sum. How a sender responds to
incorrect nonce sums is a matter of policy, but ceasing to set
ECT in outgoing segments would be one obvious response.
Across all of our data sets, we see no instances of ECN nonce
support. Manual inspection of arriving packets with ECT1
set reveals that these flows always set ECT1, even when
ECN is not negotiated by TCP. (Thus, TCP continues to
rely on cooperative and friendly behavior.)
One other mitigation strategy for dealing with paths that
mangle the ECN bits in the IP header is to check upon re-
ceipt of an ECN enabled SYN packet that the ECN field is
zero and refusing to enable ECN if it is not. While RFC
5562 suggests adding ECN capabilities to SYN/ACK pack-
ets (thus allowing a non-zero ECN field), TCP SYN packets
should never be ECN marked [16]. While this approach
does not help on paths that clear the ECN field, which is
the common error, it does address some particularly prob-
lematic manglings of the ECN field like always setting CE
(i.e. signaling constant congestion.)
6. CONCLUSION
While some impediments to wider use of ECN appear to
be diminished (i.e. servers have increasingly enabled it), an
important finding of this paper is the presence of a non-
trivial number of paths that mangle the ECN field in the IP
header. This problem compromises a carefully designed con-
gestion feedback loop and potentially raises concerns about
the congestion safety or fairness of using ECN if senders do
not receive the signal to slow their rate. Eventually a sender
would overflow the bottleneck queue and then back off, but
other flows that share partial paths would be disadvantaged.
Similar concerns exist in the case of congestion echo (ECE)
not making it to the sender. While the possibility of such be-
havior is mentioned in [24], repeated tests to servers demon-
strate this is not just a random event but rather can be
a persistent problem along a path. If the CWR is being
cleared on the other hand, the problem is instead that the
sender receives a constant stream of ECE flagged messages
and therefore never opens its congestion window – resulting
in very low throughput.
While the existence of these problems is potentially dis-
couraging we have found that the problems can often be
rapidly fixed. We identified problems on both our lab and
our residential broadband network. Both networks were
quickly fixed when we supplied packet captures and tracer-
outes illustrating the problem. In the case of our lab, the
intent had been to copy the 802.1p field from Ethernet to
DSCP but an Ethernet switch instead ended up overwriting
all eight bits of the ToS field. In the case of the broad-
band provider, the intent had been to clear the diffserv field
but instead the entire old ToS field was being set to zero.
We suspect that many of the problems we found have sim-
ilar origins. Other potential sources of error include NATs
and home routers, load balancers, tunnels, and other types
of middle-boxes. Our tools and methodology will hopefully
aid in quickly finding and fixing these problems.
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Reviewer #1 
Strengths: The results: hard, new datapoints on ECN readiness over 
much Internet infrastructure (still a good way to go but starting to 
build) and data on various pathologies that is useful to work out how 
to best improve ECN readiness (such as knowing that the core is 
clearing ECT relatively often). A well-executed measurement study 
in a very readable paper that looks at an impressive number of 
Internet paths over a variety of sub-populations. 
Weaknesses: Well, you could say that the paper is small in scope, 
just giving better datapoints on one TCP/IP mechanism, and 
unimportant, given that the mechanism is not much used in practice. 
But I think this would be a bit unfair.  
Comments to Authors: These comments are intended to help you 
improve your paper further. (1) What I liked most was your division 
of Internet devices into different sub-populations and the 
exploration of “what went wrong”. Both help to move us beyond a 
simple but unhelpful statistic (“we find that the Internet is 15% ECN 
ready”). Where you could go further is with ways to improve the 
status quo based on your findings. Are there simple tests that 
TCP/IP implementations should perform to avoid being adversely 
affected by the pathologies (detect and turn off?) or do they not 
matter much? Note that the ECN nonce can potentially help here by 
serving as a robust testing mechanism for correct implementations 
along a path -- if used properly it will detect middleboxes interfering 
with the ECN bits as well as “cheating hosts”. (2) Also, the material 
in looking for the location of problems along the path did feel rather 
speculative, since you cannot come to firm conclusions, but I 
appreciated it nonetheless. 
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Strengths: Repetition of old results with new outcomes. ECN 
deployment is still underway, but there are new challenges. 
Comprehensive testing for a short paper. 
Weaknesses: None. 
Comments to Authors: Nice short paper. Good coverage of a 
moderately interesting topic. Most of the interest is in the fact that 
there is a positive trend, but it’s disheartening to see how slow the 
positive trend is. 
 
The information in S4.2 would have been much more interesting if 
divided by AS instead of by hop-count. Once the network is 
blocking ECN, IMHO it’s more important who is doing it rather 
than where. 
It would have been useful to correlate the BitTorrent 
implementations types (by bittorrent id) or the Gnutella 
implemenations (by user-agent) to the ECN-capable nodes to better 
understand which types of nodes are ECN-capable.  
 
Reviewer #3 
Strengths: Fairly broad study of ECN. Results are interesting. Good 
positioning of results and contribution into the historical context. 
 
Weaknesses: Methodology is confusing; esp description in 2 and 
the state machine in Figure 1 seem to not match later text. While 
results are interesting, their significance can be improved, for 
example, by listing out the top fewcauses of ECN misbehavior 
today. 
 
Comments to Authors: Writing is mostly good, though another 
pass would help. Results are interesting. A more precise breakdown 
of the types of idiosyncracies that are happening, their potential 
causes, and fixes would be very useful. In the sense that, they would 
prescribe how ECN can be better supported. (The examples at the  
of Sections 4 and 5 are steps along the right path.) 
State machine in Figure 1 is cryptic. What you really mean to do, is 
to use iptables rules to mimic a congestion event along the path as a 
router would have otherwise done (mark CE on packets). However 
some of the transitions are based on packets coming in from 
different directions; ECE would come from the local client, CWR 
would come from the remote host. Also, I can’t tell what the left 
path of the tree is doing. 
OSes have ECN support but don’t turn it on by default, i.e., if the 
other end does not request ECN they wouldn’t use it. Is this 
accurate? Can you quantify how many clients/ OSes are like this? 
There seems to also be a fair bit of re-use of the ToS field, some of 
which doesn’t seem to interact correctly with ECN. It would help to 
be more concrete about these anomalies. 
In 3.4, wouldn’t using TCP @port 80 get you better pass through 
rates from proxies? 
From Table 1, it isn’t clear that mobile servers are doing any better 
on ECN.Neither are the more popular servers or university clients. 
Is there bias in the experiments, with the measuring host, or the first 
few links on the path to the measurement host(s) dominating the 
results here? 
In 4, Is ‘hop’ an IP hop, as visible from ICMP? That would be 
vulnerable to not seeing mpls segments or other circuits. 
The ambiguity, when ECT is cleared, whether it is cleared on the 
outgoing part of the previous hop or the incoming part on the next 
hop doesn’t seem to be worth chasing down. Localizing it to that 
pair would be helpful in itself. You might even get away by looking 
at multiple pairs that share an endpoint to get a better handle on 
which of those two end points may be clearing that bits. 
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Using p2p traffic to measure client eyeballs is cool, but probably not 
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Strengths: Keeping track of the ECN capabilities of Internet 
devices is important to improve TCP’s behavior across the Internet. 
Weaknesses: Given that lack of ECN capabilities of the measured 
end-hosts, I do not see a point in this paper. The methodology for 
the mobile infrastructure is weak, while this is the environment 
where ECN is likely to matter more. 
Comments to Authors: To understand mobile devices’ ECN, the 
authors can’t simply go to the mobile version of websites, but also 
need to conduct measurements from mobile devices themselves or 
use NAT devices as used by mobile operators.  
Why exactly are passive measurements not a reliable indicator of 
the prevalence of client-side ECN support? Is it the number of 
observed end-hosts? I don’t quite understand. Why would a P2P-
biased view be better? If the authors want to make claims a bout 
some bias, then please argue.  
From table 2, given that most hosts are not ECN-capable, why 
should we care about what routers do? If end-hosts were ECN 
capable and impeded by routers on the way, I would understand. 
But given the current deployment of ECN, the paper is weak.  
What is the relationship between the paths that you are probing and 
the original end-hosts for which you wanted to check the ECN 
capabilities?  
Adding to Figure 2 the absolute hop count and AS hops where ECT 
is cleared would help. The discussion on figure 2 is too short. The 
authors spend much time in the paper on discussions and 
methodological considerations, while not really giving a take-home 




Strengths: This paper presents a thorough study of the current 
support for ECN. It measures all three parts: servers (including 
servers for mobile clients), clients, and network paths. Nice 
technique to measure client support by crawling Bittorrent and 
Gnutella networks. 
 
Weaknesses: Having updated numbers is interesting, but the results 
are not that surprising. The paper lacks more analysis of the causes 
for the small ECN support and the reasons for network elements to 
mistakenly clear ECN bits. 
 
Comments to Authors: This paper presents a nice update on ECN 
support. It is important to study servers, clients, and network paths 
to fully understand the potential for ECN utilization. At the end the 
results and the analysis are not very novel.  
The paper does present a separate characterization of web servers 
for mobile devices, but the results are similar to other websites and 
there is no further discussion about this point.  
The technique to crawl p2p clients to study client support for ECN 
is nice. In general, it is hard to measure the client side. The results 
are not very telling, because the paper presents no characteristics of 
these clients. Is there a way to find out the operating system and 
other configuration details of these clients? It would be interesting 
to complete these tests with hosts where you know the OS, so that 
you can study of different OSes for ECN. 
Sec. 3.4 says that it uses ICMP traceroute probes, because the use of 
ECN doesn’t change depending on the protocol. It would be nice to 
have at least a short description of this experiment.  
In Sec. 4.2 paragraph 6, is it true that routers are consistent in the 
way they treat the ECN bits? In this section, it would be nice to have 
a discussion of why routers sometimes clear the ECN bits. Maybe 
bringing the last paragraph of the discussion to this section would 
help the readers understand this point. 
The results in Fig. 2 are biased because after a router clears the ECN 
bits, if another router in the path also clears these bits, you cannot 
detect it. So, it is expected that this curve is shifted to the left. The 
paper should at least discuss this bias or even change the 
presentation of this result. It makes more sense to discuss the ASes 
or pair of ASes where ECN bits are cleared. The analysis in terms of 
fraction of the total number of hops is confusing. 
Also in Sec. 4.2, last paragraph under “AS’s where the ECT 
codepoint is cleared,” why use the restricted inference technique? 
What is the fraction that is not labeled? Instead of trying to pinpoint 
an AS, you could characterize pairs of ASes. 
 
Response from the Authors 
We valued and addressed the feedback from all reviewers. The most 
valuable contribution came from Reviewer 1 who points out the fact 
that an ECN nonce (RFC 3540) can serve as a robust testing 
mechanism for correct ECN behavior along a path not just correct 
ECN behavior by receivers.  This is noted in RFC 3540 but we had 
overlooked it. 
A number of the reviews noted confusion on how we implemented 
the server testing using the iptables functionality of Linux.  There 
are a number of details to the implementation that are subtle 
particular if one is not familiar with iptables rules and capabilities or 
the exact protocol details of ECN.  We updated the description of 
our methodology to hopefully make it more clear but perhaps more 
importantly we have all our configuration scripts and testing tools 
available for any reader wishing to replicate our measurements. A 
benefit of our implementation is that one can easily test any 
application or service that relies upon TCP -- a feature we leverage 
to test both web servers and hosts running p2p software without 
needing any additional implementation effort. 
Some of the reviews noted a general lack of interest in our ECN 
measurements. Our interests simply differ. When we started this 
research we intended it as an email to the IETF Conex WG. The 
discovery of the devices along the path mangling the ECN bits both 
at our home and lab networks suggested there was a more 
interesting phenomenon worthy of investigation. We were 
encouraged by a number of individuals to conduct a careful study. 
Even if one is not interesting in ECN in particular, there are 
interesting lessons in regards to the challenges associated with 
reusing fields (ToS to diffserv/ECN) or using previously reserved 
bits (TCP’s CWR and ECE flags).    Also our traceroute technique 
of diagnosing ECN problems can be used for other purposes, one of 
which is a survey of diffserv code points being set by each AS (a 
study we are currently conducting.) 
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